Claimant, a European company, wished to acquire the business of Respondent 3, a South American company. To this end, it sent a letter of intent to Respondent 2, a European company, addressed to the attention of its chairman, Respondent 1. The transaction contemplated in the letter of intent was the purchase by Claimant of 50% of the shares of a company to which Respondent 3 would transfer its business and certain assets. The letter of intent was governed by Swiss law and contained a confidentiality provision prohibiting the disclosure of any information about the contemplated transaction. Following Respondent 2's termination of the letter of intent prior to the realization of the transaction, Claimant sought the payment of a contractual penalty, alleging that, by entering into an agreement with Company X before the end of the negotiating period, Respondent 1 had infringed his undertaking not to conduct parallel negotiations with any third company. Respondents objected to the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction over Respondents 1 and 3, arguing that the letter of intent containing the arbitration agreement had been executed by Respondent 2 only. In a partial award, the arbitral tribunal held that it had jurisdiction over the Claimant and Respondent 2, but not over Respondent 3. It reserved its decision on jurisdiction over Respondent 1 to its final award. In its final award, the arbitral tribunal returned to the question of its jurisdiction over Respondent 1, left pending in its first partial award.

Le demandeur, une société européenne, souhaitait acquérir l'activité du défendeur 3, une société sud-américaine. À cet effet, il avait envoyé une lettre d'intention au défendeur 2, une société européenne, qu'il avait adressée à l'attention de son président, le défendeur 1. La transaction envisagée dans la lettre d'intention portait sur l'acquisition par le demandeur de 50 % des actions d'une société à laquelle le défendeur 3 devait céder son activité ainsi que certains actifs. La lettre d'intention était régie par la loi suisse et contenait une clause de confidentialité interdisant la divulgation de toute information sur la transaction envisagée. À la suite de la résiliation de la lettre d'intention par le défendeur 2 avant la réalisation de la transaction, le demandeur a cherché à obtenir le paiement d'une pénalité contractuelle, faisant valoir que le défendeur 1, en concluant un accord avec la société X avant la fin de la période de négociation, avait failli à son engagement de ne pas mener de négociations parallèles avec des sociétés tierces. Les défendeurs ont contesté la compétence du tribunal arbitral sur les défendeurs 1 et 3, plaidant que la lettre d'intention contenait une convention d'arbitrage qui n'avait été signée que par le défendeur 2. Dans une sentence partielle, le tribunal arbitral s'est déclaré compétent vis-à-vis du demandeur et du défendeur 2, mais pas du défendeur 3. Il a réservé pour sa sentence finale sa décision quant à sa compétence sur le défendeur 1. Dans sa sentence finale, le tribunal arbitral a repris la question de sa compétence sur le défendeur 1, laissée en suspens dans sa première sentence partielle.

El demandante, una empresa europea, deseaba adquirir el negocio del demandado 3, una empresa sudamericana. A tal efecto, este envió una declaración de intenciones al demandado 2, una empresa europea, dirigida a la atención de su presidente, el demandado 1. La operación prevista en la declaración de intenciones era la compra, por parte del demandante, del 50 % de las acciones de una empresa a la cual el demandado 3 debía transferir su actividad empresarial y determinados activos. La declaración de intenciones estaba regida por la ley suiza e incluía una disposición de confidencialidad que prohibía la divulgación de toda información relativa a la operación prevista. Tras la rescisión, por parte del demandado 2, de la declaración de intenciones antes de la realización de la operación, el demandante solicitó el pago de una penalización contractual alegando que, al celebrar un contrato con la empresa X antes de que finalizara el período de negociación, el demandado 1 había infringido el compromiso asumido de no mantener negociaciones paralelas con una tercera empresa. Los demandados pusieron objeciones a la competencia del tribunal arbitral sobre los demandados 1 y 3 afirmando que la declaración de intenciones que contenía el acuerdo de arbitraje solo había sido ejecutada por el demandado 2. En un laudo parcial, el tribunal arbitral declaró que tenía jurisdicción sobre el demandante y el demandado 2, pero no sobre el demandado 3. Además se reservó su decisión acerca de la competencia sobre el demandado 1 para el laudo final. En su laudo final, el tribunal arbitral evocó la cuestión de la competencia sobre el demandado 1, que había quedado pendiente en su primer laudo parcial.

'XVI. The issue of jurisdiction with respect to [Respondent 1]

.........

2. Summary of Respondent 1's position

176. Starting in the Answer ..., Respondent 1 contended that this Tribunal was without jurisdiction as far as he was concerned: there was no arbitration agreement between him and Claimant ... and Respondent 1 and [Respondent 2] "are not one and the same" ...

177. This defence was restated in the Reply on Jurisdiction ...: Respondent 1 is not a party to the LoI and, therefore, is not bound by the provisions, among which the arbitration agreement.

178. Respondent 1 argues that it was never the intention of the Parties that he be personally committed under the LoI, whether directly or as guarantor of the companies of the [Respondent 2] Group on behalf of which he acted.

179. In its Statement of Defence ..., Respondent 1 points out that, since Partial Award No. 1 was issued, no new elements have been provided by Claimant in support of the admissibility of its claim against Respondent 1 ... Respondent 1 then restates that (i) he signed the LoI in his capacity as chairman of the Board of Directors of Respondent 2, and (ii) it is Respondent 2 that "accepted and agreed to" the LoI; reference is made to several letters addressed by [Claimant] to [Respondent 2]... and to the answer to said letters which was written on [Respondent 2]'s letterhead ...

180. Respondent 1 opposes the extension of the arbitration agreement to a non-signatory third party which is invoked by Claimant following a decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal; Respondent 1 also rejects Claimant's attempt to obtain that the corporate veil be lifted, as no evidence has been adduced in support of the application of that theory in this case.

3. Summary of Claimant's position

181. Claimant argues that the Tribunal has to identify the parties to the LoI on the basis of the parties' reasonable expectations considering the purpose of the LoI: the purpose was to prevent negotiations with third parties by any person entitled to negotiate for the target company ([Respondent 3]).

182. Claimant legitimately expected, when entering into the LoI, that no one within the [Respondent] Group would conduct negotiations with third parties during the exclusivity period; Claimant adds that this was the common intention of the Parties and that to limit the obligations stated in the LoI to Respondent 2-which was only identified at the last moment by the [Respondent] Group-would not have made sense.

183. Further, Claimant points out that Respondent 2-a party to the LoI-has not recorded the debt of the last instalment of [an earlier share purchase agreement ("SPA") between Claimant, the predecessor of Respondent 2 and Respondent 3], although the LoI does mention that it is owed "by you"; ... [Respondent 1] wrote on his personal letterhead announcing payment of said amount.

184. Alternatively, Claimant argues that [Respondent 1] became a party to the LoI "through his interference with the performance of the LoI"; Claimant cites in support of his position a decision of the Swiss Federal Court dated 16 October 2003 ... and concludes that "in light of the facts and events described, [Respondent 1] must be deemed to have adhered to the LoI as a whole, including its arbitration agreement" ...

185. In a further alternative, Claimant contends that under the theory of lifting of the corporate veil "[Respondent 1] is [...] bound by the commitment to which Respondent no. 2 subscribed and cannot rely on that company's separate legal personality. He is a party to the LoI and the arbitration agreement" ... The theory applies in this case as [Respondent 1] (i) controlled the [Respondent] Group, in particular Respondent 2, (ii) was involved in the negotiation of the LoI, (iii) breached the undertakings contained in the LoI, and (iv) "depleted and liquidated" Respondent 2 before signing the LoI although he was aware that Claimant believed that Respondent 2 was the holding of the Group.

4. Summary of Respondent 1's rebuttal arguments

186. Respondent 1 restates that he did not negotiate with "real" third parties while the LoI was in effect ..., that the agreement with [Company X] was only a "preliminary agreement" which was never implemented, with the result that shares or assets of [Respondent 3] were never sold; trademarks from Respondent 2 were transferred to an entity owned by Respondent 2 but never to [Company X].

187. Respondents do not accept that a link be created by Claimant between the termination of the LoI and the settlement of the last instalment under the [SPA], which is a debt "of a different nature" ...

188. Quoting Clause 8 of the LoI, Respondents point out that the obligation to cause directors, officers, ... to comply with the exclusivity obligation was an obligation of Respondent 2 and not of [Respondent 1], as wrongfully alleged by Claimant.

189. The theories invoked by Claimant-extension of the arbitration agreement to a non-signatory and the lifting of the corporate veil-are not applicable in the present case due to the lack of conclusive evidence ...

5. The Tribunal's position

190. The Tribunal notes that the LoI-which was prepared by [Claimant]-was addressed to "[Respondent 2], Attn.: [Respondent 1], Chairman". On the face of the letter, therefore, the term "you" used by the drafter of the letter clearly refers to [Respondent 2]. The Tribunal notes that the second letter of [date] from [Claimant] ..., which relates to the LoI, is similarly addressed to "[Respondent 2], Attn.: [Respondent 1], Chairman" ...

191. It is common ground that both letters of [date] were signed for agreement and acceptance by [Respondent 1]. The signature appears under the typed words:

"Accepted and Agreed to:

[Signature]

[Respondent 2]"

192. Therefore, in the Tribunal's view, the Parties to the LoI were [Claimant] on one part and [Respondent 2] on the other part, [Respondent 1] having signed for agreement and acceptance in his capacity of chairman of the Board of Directors of [Respondent 2].

193. On two occasions, [Respondent 1] wrote to [Claimant] on the subject of the payment of the last instalment due under the [SPA] on his own letterhead ... These letters preceded the LoI and are therefore of no probative value with respect to the jurisdiction issue under review.

194. The letter sent on [date] on [Respondent 1]'s letterhead also deals exclusively with the payment of the last instalment (which was a debt of [the predecessor of Respondent 2]) and does not concern the LoI ... As the last instalment, plus accrued interest, was paid [prior to this arbitration] and is not part of this arbitration, these letters cannot be construed as an agreement on the part of [Respondent 1] to assume the obligations provided in the LoI, among which the obligation to be subject to arbitration.

195. The Tribunal notes further that [Claimant] did not require that [Respondent 2]'s obligations under the LoI be guaranteed by either [Respondent 1] personally or by any other company of the [Respondent] Group and that the commitment under Clause 8 [2] is a commitment of [Respondent 2] which undertakes to cause its "directors, officers, agents or representatives and of [Respondent 3]" to comply with the commitment under Clause 8 [1].

196. If confusion has apparently arisen in the drafting of Clause 8 [5], inasmuch as it states that "you" ([Respondent 2]) pay the amount still owed under the [SPA], while the debt was that of [the predecessor of Respondent 2], this error does not result in adding a party to the LoI, whether a physical or legal person.

197. The Tribunal has given careful consideration to the decision of the Swiss Supreme Court dated 16 October 2003 ... Reviewing the facts of the case, the Tribunal does not find that, through his actions in this case, [Respondent 1] has expressed the intention to be personally bound by the arbitration agreement contained in the LoI.

198. Consequently, the Tribunal's decision is that it lacks jurisdiction to pass on a claim asserted against [Respondent 1].

199. As to Claimant's arguments based on the piercing of the corporate veil and on the alleged abusive restructuring of the [Respondent] Group and the liquidation of [Respondent 2], the Tribunal finds that Claimant failed to establish that [Respondent 1] abused the structure of Respondent 2 in the transaction in question. Nor is it established that the restructuring of the [Respondent] Group and the liquidation of [Respondent 2] was done abusively with the aim of depriving Claimant of a realistic chance to enforce its alleged claims against Respondent 2. First, the Tribunal points out that the amount still owed under the [SPA] was a debt of [the predecessor of Respondent 2], not of Respondent 2. Secondly, regarding Claimant's claim for liquidated damages, it must be noted that such claim, according to the record, was raised by [Claimant] for the first time ... several months after Respondent 2 had been liquidated ... At the time of the liquidation process, such claim had not yet been raised by Claimant. Under these circumstances, the liquidation of [Respondent 2] cannot be considered abusive.'